

MONTHLY BULLETIN

August 2026 | #05



In this Issue

This month's bulletin examines the economic effects of the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict, focusing on disruptions to bilateral trade and Cambodia's shifting trade routes, particularly toward Malaysia and Vietnam. The featured research further investigates the challenges faced by cassava farmers and explores opportunities to strengthen domestic cassava processing whilst reducing reliance on external markets. Additionally, this edition includes key economic data on August's commodity, oil prices, and exchange rates, and it concludes with a summary of recent training activities and events organized by the APM Center.

About APM Center

The **Akkak Pundit Sapheachar AUN Pornmoniroth Center for Policy Studies and Training (APM Center)** was established to advance knowledge, foster innovation, and enhance capacity across a wide range of stakeholders to support economic development and the development of the banking sector in Cambodia through its research and human resource development functions. The center operates under the technical and financial guardianship of the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (ARDB).

NEWS SPOTLIGHT

Cambodia-Thailand Border Conflict and Trade Shift in Cambodia

By: *Nguon SokSambath, Heang Vengkry*

1. Latest Update on the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict and Its Impact on Bilateral Trade

The Cambodia-Thailand border dispute escalated into armed conflict in late July 2025, with fighting reported around Ta Muan Thom temple and other disputed areas along the border (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025). The fighting led to the closure of all 18 land border checkpoints, severely disrupting cross-border movement. Arrivals of tourists from Thailand to Cambodia declined by 94.8% in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025 (Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia, 2026).

Cambodia-Thailand bilateral trade declined substantially following the conflict, falling 39.40% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026 and 35.40% in the second quarter. This drop reflects the compound effects of border restrictions and weaker demand for Thai products (General Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia [GDCE], 2026; Asia News Network, 2026a). In June 2025, Cambodia introduced restrictions on selected imports from Thailand as a reciprocal response to Thailand's unilateral border restrictions (Agence Kampuchea Presse, 2025). Concurrently, a broader consumer

boycott and border closure pushed trade toward maritime and alternative land routes, such as Laos (Nation Thailand, 2025).

2. Economic Effects on Thailand's Northeastern Region

The border disruption affected northeastern Thailand not only through reduced cross-border trade, but also through knock-on effects on supply chains, tourism, consumption, and employment. The Bank of Thailand (BoT) reported that the northeastern economy continued to contract in the third quarter of 2025 as the border situation compounded existing economic pressures, including weak purchasing power, high household debt, and softer external demand (Bank of Thailand, 2025).

The impact was particularly visible in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors tied to cross-border trade with Cambodia. Food production, including tapioca starch processing, contracted as firms faced difficulties sourcing raw materials following border closure. However, the disruption did not halt trade entirely. Exports to Cambodia continued across several product categories as businesses rerouted shipments through customs checkpoints outside the immediate conflict zone (Nation Thailand, 2025). This suggests that northeastern Thai provinces are not only suffering from shifts in Cambodian consumer preferences, but may also risk losing access to Cambodia as a competitive source for raw materials.

3. Trade Shifts: Malaysia and Vietnam

As direct trade with Thailand was disrupted, Cambodia's trade patterns shifted toward alternative suppliers and markets. Available evidence points to two main channels of adjustment: Malaysia gained a larger share of Cambodia's overall import basket, while Vietnam became increasingly central to agricultural trade and selected food imports.

3.1. Shift to Malaysia suppliers

Between August 2024–July 2025 and August 2025–July 2026, Cambodia's imports from Thailand dropped 35.8% (from USD3.44 billion to USD2.21 billion), while imports from Malaysia grew 57.5% (from USD0.78 billion to USD1.22 billion). This shift significantly narrowed the export gap between Malaysia and Thailand within a single year (GDCE, 2026). Specific examples include Malaysia's energy and Dairy exports to Cambodia (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Closing gap between Cambodian-Thai and Cambodia Malaysia trade 1 year before and 1 year after Cambodia-Thailand conflict





Figure 2: Monthly Cambodian Imports of Petroleum Gas and Dairy Products from Malaysia (August 2024 to August 2026)




Source: General Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia (GDCEC) monthly trade data for Thailand and Malaysia from August 2024 to August 2026

Comparing year-on-year growth before and after the conflict, petroleum fuel imports grew by approximately 25%, rising from USD74.8 million (August, 2024 - July, 2025) to USD100.6 million (August, 2025 - July, 2026). Over the same period, selected dairy imports increased from approximately USD0.37 million to USD13.93 million, nearly 3,665% increase. This market shift is further underscored by investment activity: Malaysian dairy producer Farm Fresh Berhad signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Cambodia's Alpha Group in October 2025, followed by a \$68 million commitment in August 2026 to construct Cambodia's largest dairy farm. This move was explicitly framed as a strategy to reduce Cambodia's reliance on imported milk and dairy products (Khmer Times, 2025c; New Straits Times, 2026). The disruption likely created commercial opportunities for Malaysian suppliers to absorb unmet food demand (such as dairy) and capture market share in energy, a sector previously dominated by Thai suppliers.

3.2. Agricultural Trade with Vietnam After the Border Conflict

Vietnam also emerged as a primary channel for diverted agricultural trade. A March 2026 report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA FAS) confirmed that Cambodian agricultural exporters began rerouting shipments away from the Thai border and Vietnam following the July 2025 boarder closure.

Figure 3: Shows huge decline in Thailand poultry import to Cambodia whilst poultry import from Vietnam gain momentum




Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA FAS)'s graph of Ministry of Economy, General Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia's data

On the import side, poultry imports from Thailand averaged about USD122 million per month from January to September 2025 before halting in October–December. Meanwhile, poultry imports from Vietnam began in June and increased sharply to near USD60 million following the July border closure (Figure 3). Milk and cream import from Vietnam similarly spiked, growing from under 0.5 million USD to almost USD 2 million over a three-month span during the conflict (USDA FAS, 2026).

On the export side, a similar rerouting pattern emerged as agricultural shippers diverted volumes from the Thai border toward Vietnam instead after the July 2025 closure (USDA FAS, 2026).

Figure 4 : Shows corn export to Thailand decline in comparison to Vietnam.



Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA FAS)'s graph of Ministry of Economy, General Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia's data.

Figure 4 shows that the change in Cambodia's corn export destinations. Exports to Thailand

declined by 70% in 2025, whilst exports to Vietnam emerged later in the year. Overall, the evidence confirms that Vietnam absorbed substantial portion of Cambodia's disrupted agricultural exports while serving as an alternative source for food imports (USDA FAS, 2026)

Post-conflict data may suggest that Cambodia's regional trade activity align closer to Malaysia and Vietnam across distinct product categories, with Malaysia increasingly replace Thai merchandise, while the diverted commodity strengthen Vietnam's position as Cambodia's agricultural purchaser. Nevertheless, Malaysia's trade with Cambodia was already growing by 28.6% annually in 2024, and Vietnam had long maintained an established role in regional agricultural trade. Consequently, post-2025 trends reflect a combination of conflict-related substitution and pre-existing commercial momentum. Similarly, China's trade with Cambodia, which reached USD19.73 billion in 2025, also showed similar growth before and after the conflict, making a conflict-specific effect less distinct (Agence Kampuchea Presse, 2026).

4. Economic Implications

The border disruption carries three main economic implications for Cambodia. First, short-term costs and supply pressures. In the short term, businesses face elevated trade and logistics costs as supply chains detour through alternative maritime or overland routes. There is also a risk of excess

agricultural products when exporters cannot redirect shipments quickly enough to alternative markets, potentially putting pressure on farm-gate prices and farmers' incomes. Second, Opportunities for Domestic Import Substitution. The surge in imported animal products, including dairy from Malaysia and poultry and other food products from Vietnam highlights durable domestic demand. This market signal creates an opportunity for Cambodian investors to develop domestic livestock, dairy and other animal-production industries. Third, long-term industrial upgrading. The growing presence of Vietnamese products may provide a more immediate competitive space for local producers, while imported products from Malaysia may leave room for domestic suppliers to compete on price and proximity. These possibilities require further evidence on production costs, import prices and market demand, but they suggest that the disruption could provide incentives for greater domestic investment in animal farming. In parallel, as agricultural exports are increasingly redirected to markets such as Vietnam, Cambodia could have stronger incentives to retain more raw materials domestically and invest in agro-processing. Over the longer term, these shifts could support greater domestic value addition, reduce reliance on imported products, and strengthen Cambodia's agricultural and food-processing industries.

FEATURED RESEARCH



Cambodia's Agricultural Trade with Thailand: Border Disruption, Cassava Challenges, and New Processing Opportunities

By: Sak Vandy

Cambodia's agricultural trade with Thailand before the border closure

Before the Cambodia-Thailand border closure in July 2025, Thailand was an important market for Cambodian agricultural exports, particularly cassava. In 2024 alone, Cambodia's cassava exports to the Thai market were valued at USD203.28 million (World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS], 2024).

Cassava trade was particularly important for Cambodia's north-western border provinces. According to the President of the Cassava Farmers Association of Cambodia, Thailand was Cambodia's second-largest cassava

market after Vietnam. It was estimated that Vietnam absorbed more than half of Cambodia's cassava crop, while Thailand accounted for approximately 35-40%, with Thai buyers sourcing heavily from Pailin, Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, and Preah Vihear (Ou, 2025). The border closure had a serious impact for Cambodia's agricultural exports, including cassava.

Agricultural trade after the border closure

The July 2025 border closure disrupted daily cross-border trade. Border provinces that had historically supplied cassava directly to

processing facilities in Thailand struggle to secure alternative buyers immediately. Consequently, some farmers were forced to store harvested crops or arrange longer-distance transport to Vietnam and China. These conditions increased pressure on farmers since cassava is a relatively perishable crop, and prolonged storage can reduce its quality and value (Yarrow & Kenh, 2026).

According to the General Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia (GDCE), exports of cassava and other starchy root and tuber products declined from USD209.1 million in 2024 to US\$129.9 million in 2025. In terms of volume, exports also decreased from approximately 1.727 million tonnes in 2024 to 1.171 million tonnes in 2025, representing a reduction of about 32.2%. The decline highlights the impact of reduced market access on Cambodia's agricultural trade and the challenges faced by farmers and traders in maintaining traditional cross-border trade with Thailand (GDCE, 2025).

Figure 5: Export Amount (Metric Tons)




Figure 6: Export Value of Cassava (In Million US\$)



Cassava and similar tubers exports in 2024 and 2025 shows that the decline in shipments to Thailand was accompanied by a shift toward Vietnam, particularly during the months following the border disruption. This indicates that Cambodia was able to redirect part of its cassava exports, but the shift did not prevent a decline in export earnings.

The Market shift: Vietnam and China

Following the closure of the Thai border, Vietnam and China became the main alternative destinations for Cambodian cassava. A contemporaneous account from the president of the Cassava Farmers Association described Cambodia as shifting agricultural-market attention toward domestic buyers and Vietnam, with Thai-border farmers still able to sell into the Vietnamese market, albeit at lower prices (Ou, 2025).

To formalize this trade realignment, Cambodian and Vietnamese cassava associations signed a MOU targeting up to 9 million tonnes of Cambodian fresh-cassava exports to Vietnam annually. Four companies also announced purchase commitments exceeding 3 million tonnes per year (Nguyen, 2026). However, these are targets and commercial commitments, not confirmed realized export volumes.

China also remains relevant to Cambodia's diversification strategy. Dried cassava was already exported to the Chinese market, and Cambodian officials described efforts to expand direct agricultural exports to China (Ou, 2025). China is therefore a potential destination for cassava starch and other processed cassava products, rather than only for fresh roots.

Total Cambodian cassava exports increased from 6.36 million tonnes in 2024 to 6.62 million tonnes in 2025. In contrast, exports to the Thai market dropped from 1.727 million tonnes to 1.171 million tonnes over the same period. This indicates that the decline in shipments to Thailand was more than offset by increased exports to alternative destinations, particularly Vietnam and China (GDCE, 2025).

However, the increase in export volume did not necessarily translate into higher export earnings. Cambodia's cassava and the other similar types of roots export value declined from USD728.3 million in 2024 to USD608.8 million during in 2025, a decrease of approximately US\$119.4 million or 16.40%%. The decline was particularly pronounced in the Thai market, where cassava export value fell to USD129.9 million, down 28.1% from the previous year (United Nations Cambodia, 2026). This showed that redirecting cassava to alternative markets helped maintain export volumes but did not fully compensate for the loss of the Thai market, as lower prices and longer supply chains reduced the value

received by exporters and farmers (United Nations Cambodia, 2026).

Structural Challenges for farmers and the cassava sector

While alternative trade channel exists, the border disruption exposed deep vulnerabilities within Cambodia's agricultural economy. In June 2025, Thailand's Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry estimated that Thailand processing industries relied on roughly 9 billion baht, approximately USD271 million, worth of imported Cambodian raw cassava annually (Nation Thailand, 2025).

When border trade stalled, local prices collapsed. The United Nations' assessment of the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict reported that fresh cassava prices fell to around 110-130 riel per kilogram by mid-2025, a level at which farmers struggled to cover production costs (United Nations Cambodia, 2026). These prices collapse stemmed not only from localized border closure, but also from regional market oversupplying and overlapping harvest periods in Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

Crucially, this crisis laid bare Cambodia's systemic dependence on raw commodity exports. According to the President of the Cassava Farmers Association of Cambodia, reported that Cambodia had 11 cassava flour factories, but only three were operating. Limited domestic industrial capacity restricts the country's buffer capacity during cross-border trade shocks (Ou, 2025).

While domestic animal-feed millers exist, their purchasing capacity remains too small to absorb major supply surges. Although the National Cassava Policy 2020-2025 outlines strategic goals for industrial processing, local value addition remains low (Ministry of Commerce, 2025).

Opportunity: expanding domestic cassava processing

Conditions for Successful Domestic Processing

Expanding domestic cassava processing could create important opportunities for Cambodia, but its success will depend on several conditions. First, raw material supply security. Facilities need a reliable and sufficient supply of cassava to operate continuously and efficiently (United Nations Cambodia, 2026). Second, cost competitiveness. Processing costs, including transportation, logistics, energy, labor, and other operating expenses, need to remain competitive. High logistics and production costs can weaken the ability of Cambodian processors to compete with producers in neighboring countries (Sok et al., 2026). Third, market access for finished goods. Stable domestic and export markets are necessary for processed products such as cassava starch, dried chips, and animal feed. Limited market access can create risks of oversupply and lower prices for processing businesses (United Nations Cambodia, 2026; Sok et al., 2026). Finally, access to capital and technology. Agri-processors require adequate access to finance and modern technology to

invest in efficient equipment, improve product quality, and increase value addition. Limited access to finance and outdated processing technologies remains key constraints for Cambodia's agri-food processing sector (Sok et al., 2026). Therefore, increasing processing capacity alone may not be sufficient. Without reliable raw-material supplies, competitive processing costs, stable markets, and adequate access to finance and technology, processing plants could themselves face similar market and price risks.

Promoting Domestic Value Addition

The divergence between rising export volumes (6.62 million tonnes) and falling export revenues (USD608.83 million) between 2024 and 2025 confirms the economic limits of relying strictly on raw root exports (GDCE, 2025).

For this reason, developing domestic processing could be an important opportunity for the sector. Instead of exporting most cassava as a raw agricultural product, Cambodia could process more of it into products such as starch, dried chips, and animal feed before reaching the final market. This would allow more value to be generated within the country and provide farmers with additional domestic buyers.

Recent public and private initiatives indicate early progress toward import substitutes and local value addition:

Government Partnerships: In March 2025, the Ministry of Commerce signed an agreement with six animal-feed companies to

facilitate the purchase of 81,600 tonnes of cassava, alongside other agricultural products. The agreement specifically aimed to promote investment in local agricultural processing, increase product value, and strengthen the agricultural value chain (Ministry of Commerce, 2025).

Industrial Private Investment: In April 2026, Guanshen Shengda Agriculture Industry Co., Ltd commenced on a USD 20 million processing plant in Kampong Speu Province. Once operational, the facilities project USD 90 million in turnover and it is expected to

produce 100,000 tonnes of refined cassava starch, 100,000 tonnes of dried cassava chips, and 30,000 tonnes of feed-grade residue each year (Agence Kampuchea Presse [AKP], 2026).

Ultimately, while market redirection toward Vietnam and China helped clear physical harvests during the 2025 crisis, long-term stability for Cambodian farmers depends on scaling up domestic processing capacity to capture higher margins and build resilience against external trade disruptions.

REFERENCES

- Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP). (2025). *Cambodian PM reaffirms firm stance on border gate restrictions with Thailand*. Retrieved September 19, 2026, from <https://www.akp.gov.kh/post/detail/339761>
- Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP). (2026). *Cambodia-China trade hits US\$19 billion in 2025*. Retrieved September 19, 2026, from <https://akp.gov.kh/post/detail/358816>.
- Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP). (2026). *New cassava processing plant breaks ground in Kampong Speu to boost value addition*. Retrieved September 09, 2026, from Agence Kampuchea Presse. <https://www.akp.gov.kh/post/detail/368815>.
- Asia News Network. (2026). Consumer boycott drives 40% fall in Cambodia-Thailand trade. Retrieved August 19, 2026, from <https://asianews.network/consumer-boycott-drives-40-fall-in-cambodia-thailand-trade/>
- Bank of Thailand. (2025). Northeastern region economy: Q3 2025. <https://www.bot.or.th/th/news-and-media/news/news-bot-ne-20251104.html>
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2025). Thailand launches airstrikes amid border dispute with Cambodia. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/thailand-launches-airstrikes-amid-border-dispute-cambodia>
- General Department of Customs and Excise. (2025a). International merchandise trade statistics. [data set] Retrieved September 19, 2026, from <https://stats.customs.gov.kh>
- General Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia. (2026). Cambodia-Malaysia and Cambodia-Thailand bilateral trade statistics, 2024-2026 [Data set]. <https://stats.customs.gov.kh>
- Khmer Times. (2025). Leading Malaysian dairy firm Farm Fresh signs MoU with Alpha Group.

Retrieved August 29, 2026, from <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501780100/leading-malaysian-dairy-firm-farm-fresh-signs-mou-with-alpha-group/>

Ministry of Commerce. (2024). Meeting to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the National Cassava Policy 2020–2025. Retrieved August 21, 2026, from <https://moc.gov.kh/kh/news/2127>

Ministry of Commerce. (2025). Ministry of Commerce and six animal feed production companies sign MoU to promote the purchase of maize, cassava, and other raw materials. Retrieved August 21, 2026, from <https://moc.gov.kh/kh/news/2960>

Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia. (2026). Tourism statistics: January-March 2026. <https://asset.cambodia.gov.kh/tourism/2026/05/CAM32026.pdf>

Nation Thailand. (2025). Thai firms brace for impact from Cambodia border closures, rerouting shipments and protecting staff as supply costs soar. Retrieved September 10, 2026, from: <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40051713>

New Straits Times. (2026). Farm Fresh invests US\$68mil in Cambodia dairy expansion. Retrieved September 10, 2026, from <https://www.nst.com.my/business/corporate/2026/08/1506390/farm-fresh-invests-us68mil-cambodia-dairy-expansion>

Nguyen Starch. (2026). Impact of the Thailand-Cambodia conflict on the tapioca starch industry. Retrieved August 19, 2026, from <https://nguyenstarch.com/impact-of-the-thailand-cambodia-conflict-on-the-tapioca-starch-industry/>

Nhek Sreyleak. (2024). Cambodia ranks 4th in Asia and 10th globally in cassava export. Cambodianess. Retrieved August 19, 2026, from <https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodia-ranks-4th-in-asia-and-10th-globally-in-cassava-export>.

Ou, S. (2025). Cambodia redirects its cassava and red corn away from Thai markets. Cambodianess. Retrieved August 20, 2026, from <https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodia-redirects-its-cassava-and-red-corn-away-from-thai-markets>

Sok, P. P., Ky, S., Tuy, P., & Thim, B. (2026, June 17). Agri-food processing SMEs in Cambodia (APM Center Working Paper No. 03). APM Center. https://apmcenter.ardb.com.kh/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Final_Draft_WP_03_Agri_food_Processing_SMEs_in_Cambodia.pdf

United Nations Cambodia. (2026). Socio-economic impact assessment of Cambodia-Thailand border conflict. Retrieved August 20, 2026, from <https://cambodia.un.org/en/node/313222>

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA FAS). (2026). Cambodia agricultural trade shifts 2025 (GAIN Report No. CB2026-0002). Retrieved September, 2026, from <https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=C>

ambodia%20Agricultural%20Trade%20Shifts%202025_Phnom%20Penh_Cambodia_CB2026-0002

World Integrated Trade Solution. (2024). Trade statistics by country/region [*data set*]. World Bank. Retrieved September 16, 2026, from <https://wits.worldbank.org/>

Yarrow, R., & Kenh, S. (2026). Cambodia's economy before and after the 2025 border conflict (ISEAS Perspective No. 2026/35). ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Retrieved August 19, 2026, from <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2026-35-cambodias-economy-before-and-after-the-2025-border-conflict-by-richard-yarrow-and-sovath-kenh/>

EVENTS AND ENGAGEMENTS

OUR TRAINING PROGRAM

➤ Our Research Methodology Training

August 14, 2026

The APM Center successfully concluded its training course on “Research Methodology,” featuring a training session by **H.E. They Kheam**, Technical Advisor of the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (ARDB). The training provided valuable knowledge and practical skills in research methodology, data collection, research proposal development, and the use of Stata and SPSS. The training was highly beneficial to the researchers, enabling them to successfully develop the research proposal and present it as one of the key outcomes of the training.



➤ Our Monthly Lecture Series

August 20, 2026

The APM Center successfully hosted its Lecture Series on “**Global Trends Affecting the Cambodian Economy**”, featuring a lecture by **H.E. Prof. Budit Sapheacha Dr. Sok Siphana**, Senior Minister in Charge of Special Missions (Multilateral Trade and Economic Affairs) of the Royal Government of Cambodia. The lecture provided a valuable platform for understanding the rapidly evolving global environment and its implications for Cambodia.



DATA DASHBOARD

AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PRICE MONITOR: AUGUST 2026


By: *Bun Chansereyvuth*

The August 2026 Agricultural Commodity Price Monitor indicates a generally stable agricultural market, with only minor week-to-week fluctuations in local commodity prices. Prices of essential commodities, including meat and poultry products, eggs, cereals and grains, and key agricultural inputs, remained largely stable throughout the period. Beef, bell peppers, and tomatoes recorded slight price declines, while chicken prices increased marginally. Prices of other vegetables and fruits remained broadly unchanged. Meanwhile, gasoline and diesel prices have remained stable throughout the month compared to July.

Cambodia


COMMODITY PRICE

1. Livestock Meat




Source: Data excerpted from Department of Government Policy Support of ARDB, 2026

2. Poultry and Eggs




Source: Data excerpted from Department of Government Policy Support of ARDB, 2026

3. Fruits and Vegetables




Source: Data excerpted from Department of Government Policy Support of ARDB, 2026

4. Cereal and Grains




Source: Data excerpted from Department of Government Policy Support of ARDB, 2026

5. Legumes, Oilseeds & Spices




Source: Data excerpted from Department of Government Policy Support of ARDB, 2026

6. Rice




Source: Data excerpted from Department of Government Policy Support of ARDB, 2026

OIL PRICE



Source: Ministry of Commerce, Cambodia (2026)

EXCHANGE RATE




The buy and sell prices are excerpted from the ARDB Bank's exchange rate (2026)

Vietnam


Vietnam is included as a regional comparator because it has become an important alternative market for Cambodian agricultural products following the disruption of Cambodia–Thailand trade.

LIVESTOCK




Source: <https://vietnambiz.vn/> (2026)

SPICE AND STIMULANTS



Source: <https://vietnambiz.vn/> (2026)

RICE & GRAINS



Source: <https://vietnambiz.vn/> (2026)



មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលអគ្គបណ្ឌិតសភាចារ្យ អូន ព័ន្ធមុនីរ័ត្ន
Akkak Pundit Sapheachar Aun Pornmoniroth Center



Empowerment



Excellence



Collaboration



Integrity



Respect

